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[Excerpt] The three domestically owned U.S. manufacturers of cars and light trucks are requesting federal 
financial assistance in the form of “bridge loans” to assure their ability to continue in business. The 
companies, General Motors (GM), Ford and Chrysler (collectively known as the “Detroit 3”), have directly 
appealed to Congress for aid in a series of hearings that began in November 2008. The companies have 
been affected by a long-term decline in U.S. market share, the impact of a general decline in U.S. motor 
vehicle sales in 2008 that has impacted all producers, and the effects of a severe constriction of credit, 
resulting from problems in U.S. and global financial markets. The rise in gasoline prices to more than 
$4.00 a gallon in July 2008 caused a significant fall in vehicle use and miles driven, and a structural shift 
in motor vehicle consumption patterns. The subsequent decline in gas prices in Fall 2008 has not led to 
increased consumer spending on autos and light trucks, in spite of numerous incentives by American and 
foreign-owned motor vehicle companies. 
A bill to provide up to $25 billion in direct loans to the companies was introduced on November 17, 2008, 
by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (S. 3688). This bill would make these loans available from $700 
billion already set aside by Congress in the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) established under the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA, P.L. 110-343). Earlier, Secretary of the Treasury 
Henry Paulson rejected requests to use his existing authority to designate TARP funds for this purpose. 
The Bush Administration instead proposed that bridge loans to the auto industry could be taken from the 
direct loan program for advanced technology vehicle production set up under Section 136 of the Energy 
Independence and Security Act (EISA, P.L. 110-140). This bill had become law in December 2007, and had 
been funded under P.L. 110-329, legislation that included continuing appropriations for FY2009. 
A number of other draft bills have been discussed in both houses, but none has been introduced. Senator 
Reid and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi have said that funding for bridge loans to the industry will be 
considered at a session of Congress to be convened in early December 2008, after the Detroit 3 present 
detailed plans to Congress as to how they would use the funds to assure their long-term financial viability. 
This report reviews the U.S. automotive industry at present, aspects of the industry’s financial situation, 
and relief options. It includes an analysis of the current situation in the U.S. automotive market, including 
efforts to address problems of long-term competitiveness and the impact of the industry on the broader 
U.S. economy. It focuses on financial issues, including credit questions, and legal and financial aspects of 
government-offered loans or loan guarantees. This further includes consideration of legacy issues, 
specifically pension and health care responsibilities of the Detroit 3. It also reviews potential solutions to 
the financial crisis, including options of government receivership and participation management, and 
various forms of bankruptcy. Finally, the report reviews stipulations that Congress might impose on auto 
manufacturers as conditions of providing assistance. 
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U.S. Motor Vehicle Industry:
Federal Financial Assistance and Restructuring
Summary
The three domestically owned U.S. manufacturers of cars and light trucks are
requesting federal financial assistance in the form of “bridge loans” to assure their
ability to continue in business.  The companies, General Motors (GM), Ford and
Chrysler (collectively known as the “Detroit 3”), have directly appealed to Congress
for aid in a series of hearings that began in November 2008.  The companies have
been affected by a long-term decline in U.S. market share, the impact of a general
decline in U.S. motor vehicle sales in 2008 that has impacted all producers, and the
effects of a severe constriction of credit, resulting from problems in U.S. and global
financial markets.  The rise in gasoline prices to more than $4.00 a gallon in July
2008 caused a significant fall in vehicle use and miles driven, and a structural shift
in motor vehicle consumption patterns.  The subsequent decline in gas prices in Fall
2008 has not led to increased consumer spending on autos and light trucks, in spite
of numerous incentives by American and foreign-owned motor vehicle companies.
A bill to provide up to $25 billion in direct loans to the companies was
introduced on November 17, 2008, by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (S. 3688).
This bill would make these loans available from $700 billion already set aside by
Congress in the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) established under the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA, P.L. 110-343). Earlier,
Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson rejected requests to use his existing
authority to designate TARP funds for this purpose.  The Bush Administration
instead proposed that bridge loans to the auto industry could be taken from the direct
loan program for advanced technology vehicle production set up under Section 136
of the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA, P.L. 110-140).  This bill had
become law in December 2007, and had been funded under P.L. 110-329, legislation
that included continuing appropriations for  FY2009.  
A number of other draft bills have been discussed in both houses, but none has
been introduced.  Senator Reid and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi have said that
funding for bridge loans to the industry will be considered at a session of Congress
to be convened in early December 2008, after the Detroit 3 present detailed plans to
Congress as to how they would use the funds to assure their long-term financial
viability.
 
This report reviews the U.S. automotive industry at present, aspects of the
industry’s financial situation, and relief options.  It  includes an analysis of the
current situation in the U.S. automotive market, including efforts to address problems
of long-term competitiveness and the impact of the industry on the broader U.S.
economy.  It focuses on financial issues, including credit questions, and legal and
financial aspects of government-offered loans or loan guarantees.  This further
includes consideration of legacy issues, specifically pension and health care
responsibilities  of the Detroit 3.  It also reviews potential solutions to the financial
crisis, including options of government receivership and participation management,
and various forms of bankruptcy.  Finally, the report reviews stipulations that
Congress might impose on auto manufacturers as conditions of providing assistance.
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U.S. Motor Vehicle Industry:
Federal Financial Assistance
and Restructuring
Introduction1
Are The Detroit 3 Facing an Economic Collapse?
Motor vehicle sales continued to decline in late 2008, despite falling gasoline
prices. Consumers were apparently deterred by poor economic prospects, plus the
impact of reduced credit availability. The Detroit News observed that GM and
Chrysler U.S. sales in November 2008 each fell by more than 40% compared to year-
earlier results. Ford and the three leading Japanese companies (Toyota, Honda, and
Nissan) did little better, with sales of each falling more than 30%. The poor results
occurred despite the predictions of “Many analysts [who] had expected better
November sales because of aggressive [automakers’ sales] incentives and the thought
that the plunge in gas prices may have put a floor under sales.”2
In the unfavorable economic circumstances of late 2008, all manufacturers and
sellers of motor vehicles (passenger cars and light trucks) faced difficult times in the
United States.  For the first ten months of the year, sales were down by two million
vehicles versus the same period one year earlier — a 15% decline.  Moreover, the
decline accelerated during the latter part of the year.  Sales were about one-third
lower in October 2008 compared to the same month in 2007.  Virtually every
manufacturer reported declines for the year.
Within an overall down market, the U.S.-owned automakers have fared the
worst.  The major Detroit-based auto manufacturers were formerly known as the “Big
3.”  They are not any more, because by 2007, one Japanese company, Toyota, outsold
two of the Detroit companies, Ford and Chrysler, in the United States, their own
home market.  In addition, Honda in 2008 roughly equaled Chrysler in domestic U.S.
motor vehicle sales.  Through October 2008, the Detroit 3, consisting of General
Motors (GM), Ford Motor Company, and Chrysler LLC (owned by Cerberus Capital
Management LP), had seen their annual rate of sales fall by more than 21% in total,
and by more than 20% in each case.  The Japanese, Korean, and European producers,
CRS-2
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 October 2008 data from Automotive News (November 10, 2008), table on p. 38.
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 On this point, see CRS Report RL34743, Federal Loans to the Auto Industry Under the
Energy Independence and Security Act , by Stephen Cooney and Brent D. Yacobucci, pp.
2-4.
all recorded declines in the single-digit ranges, except for Toyota, the largest
company, whose sales were down by 11.5%.3
This has not been merely a loss of some companies’ competitive position to
others, a normal shift in the marketplace.  The Detroit 3 are facing a myriad of
peculiarly disadvantageous conditions in addition to the worsening economy.  The
credit crunch that has dampened general consumer demand for new vehicles has
moreover impacted the ability of their “captive” credit companies to make loans to
either consumers or dealers for their inventories.  The Detroit 3 have much higher
legacy costs than foreign automakers, and may in some cases be more adversely
affected by stricter federal corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards.4 
The cyclical decline in the market has combined with a sudden change in
consumer preferences from trucks back to cars, to both sales decline and accelerated
losses of market shares for the former “Big 3.”  This has put their entire business
model, which includes  a collective bargaining relationship between management and
labor, at risk.  Because the foreign-owned companies in general are non-union
operations in the United States, Congress is facing the possibility that the unionized,
domestically owned motor vehicle industry could, by its own testimony, go out of the
business.  On November 17, 2008, legislation was introduced in the Senate (S. 3688)
that would have implemented a loan program to prevent one or more of the Detroit
3 from entering into bankruptcy, but a decision on any specific actions was deferred.
Organization of This Report
This report focuses on the current situation faced by the Detroit 3, key aspects
of their current crisis, including the consequences of a failure of one or more
companies, and some aspects of legislative actions that have been considered to
bridge their financial conditions to a more stable situation.  The subjects covered are:
! The impact of the automotive industry on the broader U.S. economy
and of potential failure of the Detroit 3 companies;
! Financial issues, including the present conditions affecting credit for
automotive consumers and dealers, and legal and financial aspects
of government-offered loans or loan guarantees to the industry;
! The current situation in the U.S. automotive market, including
efforts in 2007 by the Detroit 3 and the United Auto Workers union
(UAW) to address problems of long-term competitiveness;
! Potential solutions to the financial crisis, including options of
government receivership and participation management, and various
forms of bankruptcy;
CRS-3
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Major Contraction of the Detroit Three Automakers, Center for Automotive Research,
November4, 2008.
! Legacy issues, specifically pension and health care responsibilities
of the Detroit 3;
! Stipulations that Congress might impose on auto manufacturers as
conditions of providing assistance.
Impact on the National Economy5
The question of rescuing one or more of the Detroit 3 automakers comes up at
a time of considerable weakness in the overall economy.  In the third quarter of 2008,
real gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 0.3%.  Most economists are not very
sanguine about short run prospects either.  The November 2008 Blue Chip Economic
Indicators consensus forecast was for real GDP to decline by 0.4% for all of 2009
and for the unemployment rate to reach 8.5% by the end of next year.6  The prospect
of a failure of any of the big three U.S. automakers could only cast more gloom on
that outlook.
In the third quarter of 2008, the total value of motor vehicle output was $331.3
billion out of a total gross domestic product (GDP) of $14,429.2 billion.7  Motor
vehicle production thus represents 2.3% of total output.  The total number of workers
employed in the manufacture  of U.S. autos in 2007, measured on an annual basis and
somewhat different from the numbers generated in the table above, was 859,000.  Of
those, 186,000 worked in light vehicle assembly, and 673,000 were employed in the
manufacture of parts.8 Economists generally assess that economic growth of at
least 2% is required to accommodate a growing labor force and keep the rate of
unemployment from rising.  A loss of anything approaching 2% of output would very
likely lead to significant increases in the unemployment rate in the short run. 
 The Center for Automotive Research (CAR), an organization supported in part
by industry contributions, did an economic simulation of a failure of domestic
automakers based on two separate sets of assumptions.9  In the first case it was
assumed that the problems of the Detroit 3 automakers led to a permanent 100%
decline in the production of domestic automakers in the first year (2009).  It was also
assumed that the effect of that shock would result in a such a large drop in the
demand for parts that suppliers would be forced to either liquidate or restructure.  It
was assumed that the disruption to the parts suppliers would cause domestic
production of foreign-owned auto manufacturers to also drop to zero in the first year.
CRS-4
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 The possibility of firms operating in some form of reorganization under bankruptcy is
considered below.
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 As discussed below, the number of jobs in auto-related services categories is three or four
times the number in the manufacturing of motor vehicles and parts.
In this scenario, the total number of jobs lost in the United States in the first year
was estimated to be 2.95 million.  That figure includes jobs lost at auto
manufacturers, parts suppliers, as well as in the rest of the economy because of the
drop in consumer spending resulting from the direct job losses.  In the second year
(2010), production at the foreign-owned firms begins to pick up and employment
recovers somewhat with the number of jobs lost falling to 2.46 million.
The second CAR analysis assumes that although in the first year (2009)
domestic production of the Detroit 3 automakers drops to zero, auto production
recovers to 50% of its former output in the second year and continues at that level.
In this scenario, the estimated U.S. job loss in the first year is 2.46 million, falling to
1.50 million in the second year.
A general criticism of this analysis is that it assumes that the suppliers and all
other automakers, aside from the the initially failed company or companies, would
see their output drop to zero, and that they would be merely passive observers of an
industry collapse.10  There are many examples in recent years of bankrupt or
financially distressed suppliers being supported by their OEM customers, or by other
suppliers that acquire parts of the business to gain new contracts or to be able to
continue servicing their own contracts from a failed subassembly producer.  Different
examples include Collins & Aikman, Plastech, and ten Visteon plants, whose
ownership reverted to Ford as the Automotive Holdings Group.  While CAR posits,
for the sake of analysis, that, in the first year, no auto manufacturing in the United
States could survive a major Detroit 3 bankruptcy, in actuality, such an extreme
outcome is unlikely.  Immediate and radical restructurings among suppliers are a
more likely outcome, and other brands would continue to produce.  
In addition, the CAR totals on job losses include losses at dealers, repair shops,
retails parts stores, and other auto-related occupations, most of which would survive
a Detroit 3 OEM bankruptcy, at least in the short term.11  Sales in late 2008 continued
at annualized monthly rates of about 10 million vehicles, indicating considerable
continuing demand, much of which could be supplied from discounted inventory in
cases where new vehicle supply was interrupted.  And even if all new car production
in the United States fell to zero in the next year, some of the money that would have
been spent on new cars would instead be spent on repairs and maintenance, so
income and employment in those firms would be likely to rise.
Moreover, the CAR analysis is only partial, with respect to the redistribution of
consumer spending and the national economy.    Some of the money that otherwise
would have been spent on cars produced in the United States might instead be spent
on cars manufactured abroad. An increase in car imports would have several effects.
It would increase the supply of dollars in foreign exchange markets, tending to reduce
the price of the dollar in terms of foreign currencies.  A fall in the value of the dollar
in foreign exchange markets would have the effect of reducing the price of goods and
CRS-5
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(November 14, 2008).
13
 Klier and Rubenstein, “Who Really Made Your Car?,” (October 2008 article). Also
discussed more fully in their book of the same title.
services produced in the United States to foreigners.  That would tend to stimulate
exports more generally, offsetting to some extent the loss of domestic car sales.  
Separately from the CAR simulations, the chief economist of the economic
consultancy firm Global Insight, Nariman Behravesh, has estimated what the effects
of a GM liquidation would be.  He assumed that associated supplier shutdowns,
combined with that of GM, would push the national unemployment rate up by a point
from a projected 2009 level of 8.5% to 9.5%. “...[S]pending for existing programs,
such as unemployment insurance, and new measures that would be needed to revive
economic growth ... would cost the government $200 billion should [GM] be forced
to liquidate,” Behravesh said in an interview.  Expenditures would be especially
focused on Michigan, Ohio, and Indiana, he added.12
To the extent that consumers are forced to delay new car purchases, some of that
money might be saved until more new cars became available.  Any increase in saving
would tend to lower interest rates, below what they would otherwise be, reducing the
cost of other credit-financed purchases.  Spending for household furnishings such as
appliances or furnishings might benefit.  If the money that might otherwise have gone
to a new car purchase is not saved it could result in increased output and employment
in other firms.  Some of the estimated direct effects of the loss in employment in
auto-related firms might thus be mitigated by gains in other sectors, but in the short
run any of these offsetting gains would likely be considerably less than the immediate
effect of auto-related job losses.
Any loss of output due to the difficulties with U.S. automakers will likely be felt
nationwide, but because of the geographic concentration of those firms it will be
much greater in some regions than in others.  According to Klier and Rubenstein,
Michigan accounts for one-quarter of all auto parts.13  They also point out that there
is a corridor between the Great Lakes and the Gulf of Mexico that has become known
as “auto alley.”  In 2008, 43 of 50 auto assembly plants are located in auto alley.
Those geographic areas where automakers are concentrated would experience the
greatest economic difficulties resulting from any loss of U.S. auto output.
It is important to keep in mind that all of the changes discussed in this section
are measured relative to what would happen in the absence of a disruption of Detroit
3 auto production.  While it would certainly be noticeable in auto alley, there may
well be significant areas of the country where the effects would be negligible and
would not be readily apparent from one quarter to the next.
In the long run the U.S. economy tends toward full employment.  Slack labor
markets tend to  slow wage growth and eventually lead to an increase in the demand
for labor.  But if the demand for autos is increasingly met by foreign made cars, or
by increasing capacity in existing plants in other locations, then autoworkers who
have lost their jobs may face either relocating or retraining.
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Financial Issues in the Auto Industry
Credit Conditions14
Credit is the lifeblood of the U.S. auto industry.  Credit conditions govern the
industry’s ability to invest, the ability of its dealers to finance their inventory
(“floorplan”), and the ability of dealers, in turn, to sell to individual consumers.  The
systemic crisis in the U.S. and global financial markets in 2008 has had an adverse
impact on all these aspects of automotive credit.  
An auto dealer’s floorplan is the financing dealers have for their inventory.  A
dealer will generally buy cars from the original equipment manufacturer (OEM),
most often in the past on credit provided by the OEM’s “captive” financial
organization.  The dealer will then sell vehicles to customers at a negotiated
transaction price. The dealer will be paid, alternatively:
! in cash by the customer;
! through a financial transaction by the OEM captive credit
organization; or, 
! through a third party loan to a customer from a bank, credit union,
or finance company. 
Each of the Detroit 3 has a captive credit organization for both floorplan
financing and consumer credit: General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC),
Ford Motor Credit and Chrysler Financial, respectively.  Floorplan financing has
generally been provided for dealers by these credit organizations at favorable (better
than prime) interest rates.  Dealers have also been financially encouraged to refer
customers to the captive finance organizations.  For much of the period since 2000,
a very large share of each of these OEM’s corporate profits has been accounted for
by its captive financial organization.
But the financial performance of the three credit organizations has progressively
deteriorated.  According to Automotive News:
Standard & Poor’s has assigned subinvestment-grade ratings to all three finance
arms. Ford Credit and GMAC are rated B- with a credit watch of negative.
Chrysler Financial has an S&P rating of CCC+ with a negative outlook ...15
This means that the financial arms are finding it much more difficult to raise
capital to lend to dealers or customers.  GMAC, in particular, has virtually ceased
lending except to customers with the highest credit scores, and has stopped
supporting domestic leasing altogether.  All three companies have had to raise
CRS-7
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interest rates on floorplan financing, in many cases forcing dealers or customers to
use third-party lending.16
Two of the three captive credit organizations are now controlled by the private
equity hedge fund Cerberus Capital Management.  Cerberus acquired Chrysler’s
credit arm with its acquisition of a controlling share (80.1%) of the auto
manufacturing operation in 2007.  Earlier, it had bought a 51% stake in GMAC.
GMAC has been particularly affected by the global credit squeeze and subprime
lending, as it had become a major player in mortgage lending through its Residential
Capital (ResCap) division.  The latter has been primarily responsible for GMAC’s
multibillion-dollar losses in 2008.17
Ford Motor Credit remains 100% owned by Ford Motor Company.  It has
sought to offset negative reports on credit availability by widely advertising that Ford
consumer credit is still available.  It has raised floorplan financing rates by 0.5% in
view of higher borrowing costs, but has also waived the increase for dealers that meet
overall sales targets.18
The Japanese OEMs are not as impacted by the financial crisis.  Traditionally
weaker than the U.S. companies’ financial arms and more reliant on third-party
consumer lending by banks, they have become much more competitive in recent
years.  Notably, Toyota has inaugurated an aggressive “Saved by Zero” consumer
lending campaign that features 0% loans for qualified buyers on most models. 
Nissan has followed suit.19
Customers and dealers have alternatively sought to finance deals through banks,
but the banks are also reducing their consumer lending.20  Dealers have sought
alternative inventory funding sources from community banks, which generally have
funds to loan, and which have not been as severely affected by the subprime
mortgage crisis as the money center banks.  The local banks may offer more
attractive financing rates than the OEMs, but for many dealers, they do not have the
scale to cover a dealer’s floorplan.21
Credit has thus been more difficult for the Detroit 3, their dealers, and their
customers.  Former U.S. senator from Michigan and Bush Administration cabinet
member Spencer Abraham has written that an estimated $700 billion to $800 billion
in auto loan exposure “is currently thrashing around our financial system.”  He has
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further stated that securities tied to auto loans account for more than 25% of all asset-
backed securities, with large holdings by insurance companies, mutual funds, and
pension funds, as well as banks.22  GMAC on November 20, 2008, applied to become
a bank holding company, in order to make itself eligible to obtain new capital from
the EESA financial relief package described in a section above.23  However, unlike
the situation in subprime home mortgages, CEOs at the November 18, 2008, Senate
Banking Committee hearing on the domestic auto industry said that there had not
been a major rise in delinquencies among their consumer credit borrowers.24
Aside from consumer and dealer credit, another issue has been the unavailability
of capital for major Detroit 3 investment projects.  Delphi is GM’s former parts-
making subsidiary, now an independent company, but still linked to GM by a
supplier relationship and labor contracts through the UAW and other unions.  It has
been operating in bankruptcy since 2005, and was unable to exit as planned in 2008
because a private investor group backed out of a deal to buy its securities for $2.5
billion.25  GM’s plan to acquire Chrysler and merge the two companies, which was
widely reported in October 2008, was similarly withdrawn when the companies could
not find sufficient funds, including proposed federal financial support, for the deal.26
The plan could still be resurrected as part of a general plan of government financial
assistance for the Detroit 3.
Direct Bridge Loan Provisions27
On November 17, 2008, Senator Reid introduced S. 3688, which, among other
things, would amend the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 to authorize
loans to automobile manufacturers and component suppliers, and for other purposes.
The direct bridge loan provisions in S. 3688 (the act) provide the Secretary of the
Treasury (the Secretary) with broad discretion to make loans to automobile
manufacturers and component suppliers.  The Secretary would be authorized to make
loans in an aggregate amount equal to $25 billion.  According to the bill, applicants
for federal loans would be required to have: 
operated a manufacturing facility for the purposes of producing
automobiles or automobile components in the United States
throughout the 20-year period ending on the date of enactment of this
title.28
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Some foreign-owned manufacturers would be excluded from eligibility for
federal loans, because they have constructed their U.S. factories in the past twenty
years.  Toyota, Honda, and Nissan, however, all have operated plants in the United
States for longer than the minimum period, but none has indicated any interest in
applying for loans.  In addition, the Secretary would have to determine if the failure
of an applicant’s operations in the United States “would have a systemic adverse
effect on the overall United States economy.”
The act would allow the Secretary to prioritize the distribution of loans using
a number of general criteria.  Thus, the Secretary would have broad discretion in
allocating loan amounts among applicants.  Applicants for loans would have to
submit a plans for the long-term viability of their companies.  Furthermore,  an
applicant would be required to specify how a loan would “improve the capacity of
the company to pursue the timely and aggressive production of energy-efficient
advanced technology vehicles.”
The costs incurred by the federal government in making direct bridge loans,
including credit subsidy costs and administrative expenses, would be covered by
appropriated funds obtained from the sale of Treasury securities.29  The Federal
Credit Reform Act of 1990 requires, beginning with FY1992, that the reported
budgetary cost of a credit program (direct loan or loan guarantee program) equal the
estimated subsidy costs at the time the credit is provided.30  For a proposed credit
program, the Congressional Budget Office is responsible for making the initial
estimate of the subsidy cost.  If the bill is enacted into law then the Office of
Management and Budget calculates the estimated subsidy cost. 
On the third day  after the law is enacted, the Secretary would begin accepting
applications for loans. The Secretary would determine the eligibility of an applicant
within 15 days of the receipt of the application for a loan.  The Secretary would begin
disbursing the proceeds of a loan within seven days after the receipt of a disbursal
request from the applicant.  Compared to other credit programs, these deadlines are
short.
Loans would mature in 10 years, but the Secretary could determine a longer
maturity period.  During the first five years, the interest rate would be 5% per year.
For all subsequent years, the interest rate would be 9% per year.  These rates are far
below what the companies would have to pay on the private credit markets if they
could obtain credit.
The Secretary would be required to receive from the automobile manufacturer
or component supplier a warrant or senior debt instrument.  The act gives the
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Secretary broad discretion in meeting this requirement.  Borrowers could repay their
loans at any time without any prepayment penalty.
The act includes numerous general restrictions on compensation of senior
executive officers of companies that receive loans.  A senior executives officer is
defined as “an individual who is one of the top five most highly paid executives of
a public company....”     
The Domestic Motor Vehicle Market31
Loss of Detroit 3 Market Share
As reported earlier by CRS,32 foreign brands, both imported and produced at
U.S. plants, have been gaining market share for decades. Major market shifts in the
automotive sales did not happen overnight.   As illustrated in Figure 1, the Detroit
3’s decline relative to the total U.S. market has continued since 2000.  However, the
slope through 2005 was rather gentle: from two-thirds of the total U.S. market for
passenger cars and light trucks in 2000, the Detroit 3 share declined gradually to
58.2% in 2005.  Some of this decline represented aggressive U.S. manufacturing and
expansion plans by foreign-owned companies: Toyota, Honda, Nissan, and Hyundai
have all opened new assembly plants in the United States since 2000, and more are
on the way.
However, after losing eight points of market share in 2000-2005, the Detroit 3
saw their losses accelerate by an additional 10 points between then and the first three
quarters of 2008, to an annual level of just over 48% market share.  This occurred
while the total market itself was declining.  The U.S. automotive market is
notoriously cyclical, and the decline in 2008 is not exceptional compared to declines
in earlier recessions.33  Figure 1 indicates that the total domestic light motor vehicle
market stabilized at around 17 million sales per year through 2005 (passenger cars
and light trucks, which include sport utility vehicles, minivans, and pickup trucks).
It dropped about a half-million units in 2006 to 16.5 million, another half-million to
just more than 16 million in 2007, then to an annual rate of  just 14.4 million in the
first three-quarters of 2008.34  The annual rate of car and truck sales by the Detroit
3 fell to less than seven million, compared to 11.5 million in 2000, and almost 10
million as late as 2005.  More detailed data show that each of the Detroit 3 saw sales
decline by about one million vehicles or more, and each suffered significant market
share losses.
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Automotive data is usually figured in “units,” which means, for example, that
an expensive Cadillac Escalade counts the same as an inexpensive Kia Rio.  But for
the entire industry, average new vehicle transaction prices, after rising from 2004
through 2007, fell steadily in 2008, meaning less “top line” revenue per unit sold.35
Moreover, Table 1 illustrates that part of the Detroit 3’s problems relate to the
continued reliance on truck sales, when light trucks are declining as an overall share
of the market.  Having become more specialized in larger vehicles, the Detroit 3 have
been especially adversely affected by the sharper decline in the sales of such vehicles.
Sources: Automotive News Market Data Center (2008 data); Ward’s Automotive Yearbook (2001-
2008).
In 2001, “light truck” sales, which include smaller SUVs known as “crossover”
utility vehicles (CUVs), were higher than U.S. passenger car sales for the first time.
Trucks’ lead over cars continued to expand through 2005 — 9.3 million units to 7.7
million units in that year, for a net margin of 1.6 million.  But 2004-2005 saw
Hurricanes Ivan, Katrina, and Rita, which shut down substantial portions of oil and
gas production in the Gulf of Mexico and exacerbated a period of rising fuel prices
and volatility that has continued through 2008.36  Through the first three quarters of
2008, U.S. car sales were actually up slightly at an annual rate over the previous year,
but truck sales were almost one million less than car sales, down by almost two
million units sold over the previous year, and almost three million units less than the
all-time 2005 annual peak in truck sales.  While most foreign-owned manufacturers
had also expanded their truck offerings (including SUVs and minivans) in the U.S.
market, they have not been as reliant as the Detroit 3 on truck products.  By 2008,
each of the Detroit 3 still counted on light trucks for the vast majority of sales (60%),
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Figure 1. U.S. Motor Vehicle Sales
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while no foreign-owned competitor did so.  Only about a third of foreign-brand
companies’ sales overall were classified as trucks.
Table 1. Market Shares of U.S. Car and Truck Sales
Manufacturers
Sales (millions of units)
2001 2005 2007
2008
(Jan.-Sept.
Annualized
Rate)
Cars LightTrucks Cars
Light
Trucks Cars
Light
Trucks Cars
Light
Trucks
GM 2.3 2.6 1.8 2.7 1.5 2.3 1.5 1.7
Ford 1.5 2.4 1.0 2.1 0.8 1.7 0.8 1.3
Chrysler 0.6 1.7 0.5 1.8 0.6 1.5 0.5 1.1
Detroit 3 (tot.) 4.4 6.7      3.3 6.6 2.9 5.5 2.8 4.1
Asian Brands 3.3 1.9 3.6 2.6 4.0 2.8 4.1 2.3
Ger. Brandsa 0.8 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.7 0.2
Total U.S.
Sales 8.4 8.7 7.7 9.3 7.6 8.5 7.7 6.6
Sources: As for Figure 1.
a. BMW, Volkswagen/Audi and Mercedes Benz brand of Daimler AG only. U.S. total includes other
specialty manufacturers.
Both the market and federal regulation have already begun to push fuel economy
levels upward in the present decade, leading to a move away from larger, less fuel-
efficient vehicles, a market that the Detroit 3 have generally dominated.  While the
CAFE standard set by the Department of Transportation’s National Highway
Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) for cars has held steady at 27.5 mpg
throughout the decade, the actual average of model-year vehicles sold, as measured
on a different basis by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), has increased
from 22.9 mpg to 24.1 mpg, with most of the gain coming in model year (MY) 2007-
2008.37  While the light truck standard held steady at 20.7 mpg through 2004, actual
average truck mpg, as measured by EPA, remained less than 17.0 mpg, and declined
slightly on a net basis.  For light trucks, both the CAFE standard and the market have
moved upward, with an actual average mpg of 18.1 by MY2008.
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Labor Negotiations in 2007 to Address Competitive Issues
Many analysts have commented that, in competing with foreign-owned auto
manufacturers, the Detroit 3 are hampered by outdated labor contracts, negotiated
with the UAW through decades of collective bargaining.38  In 2007, each of the
Detroit 3 negotiated new collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) with their
principal union, the UAW.39  These agreements provided for transfer of retiree health
care in 2010 from the companies to a separate trust, with some board members
appointed by the UAW.  The trusts are to be established with financial support
initially from each of the Detroit 3.  The agreements also provided the companies
with other flexibility in managing and reducing labor costs, so that they could
compete on a footing perceived to be more equal to foreign-owned companies, which
are generally non-union in the United States.  This included union acceptance of a
second, and lower, tier of wages and benefits for new hires by the Detroit 3, under
specified circumstances.40  As Steven Mufson pointed out in the Washington Post,
however:
The last bargaining agreement gave GM permission to hire new workers at lower
wages to bring down average salaries. But with the slumping auto market, GM
isn’t doing much hiring and average pay hasn’t declined as much as expected.41
  Bolstered by the new contracts, the Detroit 3 expressed their commitment to
producing a greater share of fuel efficient, advanced technology vehicles as part of
their fleets.  But the cost of such changes raised doubts about their financial ability
to contribute to this national goal over the longer term. 
 
The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA)
The new collective bargaining agreements were negotiated and ratified by the
time Congress approved, and President Bush signed, a substantial increase in
mandated fuel economy in EISA (P.L. 110-140) in December 2007.  Although the
Detroit 3 were losing money, the new labor agreements, combined with an EISA
direct loan program for manufacturing advanced technology vehicles and
components, appeared to provide new resources for a transition that would aid the
Detroit 3 in achieving improved fuel economy.42
By the time Congress considered funding this program in September 2008, the
economic climate for the Detroit 3 had worsened markedly.  The downturn in the
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broader domestic economy reduced sales for virtually all manufacturers in the middle
of the year, as consumer confidence declined and credit became harder to obtain.
While neither Ford nor GM has been profitable since 2006, the operating losses
turned much worse in 2008.  After total GM losses of $18.7 billion for the first two
quarters, the company reported an adjusted third-quarter loss of $4.2 billion.  Ford
reported a small net profit in early 2008, but that was offset by an $8.7 billion loss
in the second quarter.  It had only a small reported net overall loss in the third
quarter, but its after-tax operating loss was $3 billion.  “Cash burn” (net operating
cash loss) for the two companies accelerated to about $7 billion each for the quarter.43
In testimony before the Senate Banking Committee on November 18, 2008, CEO
Robert Nardelli of privately held Chrysler acknowledged that, after losing money in
the first half of the year, his company’s “cash burn” increased to $3 billion in the
latest quarter. At the same hearing, UAW President Ron Gettelfinger acknowledged
that of the three companies, GM was in most immediate danger of failure, and
Chrysler was next; Ford, having arranged credit during a more favorable period two
years earlier, was in less immediate danger.44
Representatives of the Detroit 3 reportedly attempted to increase the scale of
loans available during legislative consideration of appropriations to fund the EISA
direct loan program, as well as to reduce restriction of the EISA loans to production
of advanced technology vehicles.  But these efforts were unavailing, as Congress
maintained the same program rules, when it approved the appropriations in
September 2008.45  
Legislative Efforts to Assist Automakers
Following the November 2008 elections, the Bush Administration was asked to
consider making funds available to the auto industry from the $700 billion
appropriated for relief of the financial sector in the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act (EESA, P.L. 110-343).46  But these efforts were unsuccessful, as
Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson and Senate Minority Leader Mitch
McConnell instead urged Congress to assist the automakers by diverting funds from
the EISA loan program.47  
On November 17, 2008, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid introduced S. 3688,
which, in Title II, included a provision allowing $25 billion from the EESA funding
to be used as loans to automakers in the United States under certain conditions.  On
November 18-19, hearings were held before the Senate Banking Committee and the
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House Financial Services Committee, in which the chief executive officers of the
Detroit 3, as well as President Gettelfinger of the UAW, made the case for immediate
assistance to the industry.  They were supported by some Members of Congress.
Critics of such assistance were also heard.  
The industry CEOs stated that they were asking for “bridge loans” to tide them
over, during a market decline of  unanticipated severity, which had affected all
automakers, and an equally unanticipated unavailability of credit from financial
markets.  The bridge loan would provide time for cost-saving measures, including the
transfer of retiree health care responsibilities, to work.  That plus a hoped-for
recovery of the domestic auto market by 2010, could allow the Detroit 3 to return to
financial stability.  As GM CEO G. Richard Wagoner testified:
[We, in cooperation with the UAW] have taken actions designed to improve
GM’s liquidity by $20 billion by the end of 2009, and they obviously affect every
employee, retiree, dealer, supplier, and investor involved in our company ... I do
not agree with those who say we are not doing enough to position GM for
success. What exposes us to failure now is not our product lineup, is not our
business plan, is not our employees and their willingness to work hard, it is not
our long-term strategy. What exposes us to failure now is the global financial
crisis, which has severely restricted credit availability and reduced industry sales
to the lowest per capita level since World War II.
Our industry, which represents America’s real economy, Main Street, needs a
bridge to span the financial chasm that has opened before us. We’ll use this
bridge and we’ll use it effectively to pay for essential operations, new vehicles
and power trains, parts from our suppliers, wages and benefits for our workers
and suppliers, and taxes for state and local governments that help deliver
essential services to millions of Americans.48
In the hearings, the CEOs revealed how the $25 billion in loans would be
divided among their three companies.  CEO Wagoner of GM stated that his company
would need $10-12 billion to bridge the present period of financial insecurity, while
Robert Nardelli of Chrysler said that his company would require $7 billion.  CEO
Alan Mulally of Ford stated that Ford currently did not have an operating capital
shortfall, but would request that $7 billion to $8 billion be reserved in case of
eventual cash needs.49
Congressional critics of the industry’s requests included Senator Richard
Shelby, ranking member of the Banking Committee, and Representative Spencer
Bachus, who holds the same position on the House Financial Services Committee.
They argued that to a large extent, the problems of the Detroit 3 were due to the long-
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term consequences of poor management and labor decisions, which would not be
fixed with short-term financial assistance, and that the industry would soon be
requesting additional federal support.  Moreover, assistance to the auto industry, it
was stated, would encourage other industries to also importune the federal
government for aid during the present economic downturn.  In the November 18
hearing, Senator Bob Corker of Tennessee also argued that no assistance should be
provided until the contract provision that guarantees hourly production employees of
the Detroit 3 most of their pay even when they were not working (a benefit not
enjoyed by most U.S. workers) is modified.
In any event, no action was taken in the Senate on S. 3688, while the House was
not even convened for a full session in November.  A bipartisan group of senators
supportive of the auto industry did reportedly offer compromise legislation designed,
in effect, to borrow funds from the EISA direct loan program for the automakers’
immediate and general use.  These funds could then be restored as originally
programmed, when the companies were able to pay back the loans.  No action was
taken on this proposal, either.  Instead, Senate majority Leader Reid and Speaker of
the House Nancy Pelosi offered the Detroit 3 an opportunity to return in early
December 2008, and present detailed plans regarding how they would use federally
loaned funds to help them recover and achieve long-term financial viability.50
Employment in the Automotive Sector
 Employment in the automotive sector of the U.S. economy includes both
manufacturing and services activities, but the latter actually employ more than in
manufacturing.  As seen in Table 2, in September 2008 the Current Employment
Survey of the Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated that there
were about 857,000 persons employed altogether in motor vehicle manufacturing
(including heavy trucks, trailers and other vehicles), compared to more than 3.7
million in various service activities.
Since the era of Henry Ford, automotive employment has been a mainstay of
U.S. manufacturing employment. But it has declined significantly in recent years,
despite the opening or expansion of foreign-owned assembly and parts facilities.
Table 2 examines levels of and changes in automotive employment by both
manufacturing and services categories.51  It presents the latest published data, from
September 2008, compared to September 2001, on a seasonally adjusted basis, to
measure against a comparable point in the business cycle.  Motor vehicle
manufacturing employment in 2008 was down about 82,000 jobs, a drop of 30%.
However, as pointed out by Thomas Klier and James Rubenstein, as well as in earlier
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CRS analyses, by far more people are employed in parts manufacturing than in motor
vehicle assembly.52  In September 2008 total employment in all categories of
automotive manufacturing was 857,000, down about 30% from 1.2 million in 2001.
Table 2. U.S. Automotive Employment
Manufacturing NAICS
Code
All Employees (‘000s)
Sept. 2001 Sept. 2008 Change
Motor Vehicle Mfg. 3361 277.8 196.0 -81.8
Motor Veh. Bodies and Trailers 3362 155.7 128.7 -27.0
Motor Vehicle Parts 3363 767.6 531.9 -235.7
Total Motor Vehicle Mfg. 1,201.1 856.6 -344.5
Services:
Wholesale Distribution 4231 348.6 340.1 -8.5
Auto Dealers 4411 1,227.8 1,180.3 -47.5
Auto Pts., Accessories & Tires 4413 496.9 504.5 7.6
Gasoline Stations 4470 921.2 833.9 -87.3
Auto Repair & Maintenance 8111 902.2 864.1 -38.1
Total Automotive
Employment
5,097.8 4,579.5 -518.3
Source: Dept. of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Current Employment Survey (Nov. 22, 2008).
Service activities employment directly related to the automotive industry has
also declined, but not nearly as significantly as manufacturing employment in the
sector.  Wholesale distribution of vehicles and parts fell by about 8,500 jobs.
Employment at dealers — the largest single North American Industry Classification
System category in the sector, with more than one million jobs — fell by 47,500 jobs,
or just 4%.  Employment in retail outlets for automotive parts, accessories, and tires
actually grew by 7,600 jobs.  The largest decline in automotive services employment
since September 2001 has been at gasoline stations, where jobs fell by 87,000 or
almost 10%.
Automotive manufacturing employment has also fallen as a share of total
employment in manufacturing.  While total manufacturing employment has fallen by
more than three million jobs since September 2001, employment in motor vehicle
manufacturing dropped at an even faster rate, with its  share of total manufacturing
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employment falling from 7.4% to 6.4%.  During this period, total automotive sector
employment, including services, as shown in Table 2, fell from 5.1 million to 4.6
million, while total U.S. employment grew by six million.  As a result, automotive
employment, including both manufacturing and services, as a share of total U.S.
employment, fell from 3.9% to 3.3%.
Financial Solutions: Bridge Loan or Bankruptcy?53
Possible solutions for the financial problems facing the Detroit 3 run along a
continuum from bridge loans to bankruptcy.  Along this continuum are loans from
the federal government; government sponsored reorganization — essentially
customized federal conservatorship for the automakers patterned after Chapter 11
bankruptcy; Chapter 11 bankruptcy — prepackaged or otherwise; and Chapter 7
bankruptcy.  Bankruptcy will be discussed first because some understanding of
bankruptcy is pertinent to discussion of the other options.
Bankruptcy
Most domestic corporations have two choices when filing bankruptcy: Chapter
754 or Chapter 11.55  Chapter 7 involves liquidation, effectively ending the
corporation’s existence.  Chapter 11 involves reorganization, generally allowing the
company to modify contract obligations and debts so it can be financially viable and
continue its operations long-term.  However, some cases filed under Chapter 11
result in liquidation.  
Under the Bankruptcy Clause of the U.S. Constitution,56 Congress may create
sections of the Bankruptcy Code (shortened in this part of the report to simply “the
Code”) to address issues of a particular type of industry or entity so long as the laws
are uniform rather than for a specific, named debtor.  In the past, during times of
financial turmoil, Congress has modified the existing bankruptcy law.  Examples
include Chapter 9: municipalities (11 U.S.C. § 901 et seq); Subchapter IV of Chapter
11: railroads (11 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1174), and Chapter 12: farmers and fishermen (11
U.S.C. § 1201 et seq).  Congress has the power to modify the Code to customize
reorganization for the automotive industry.57  Therefore, the following discussion of
Chapters 7 and 11 generally describes the characteristics of these two chapters of the
existing Code, but should not be interpreted as constraining Congress’s ability to
enact laws that would modify the provisions of these chapters as they apply to the
automotive industry or to create an additional chapter of the Code that is applicable
to the automotive industry.
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Chapter 7.  In Chapter 7, a trustee is appointed by the U.S. Trustee.  The
trustee takes over the company’s assets, sells them, and distributes the proceeds to
the creditors who have presented valid claims.  There is a hierarchy to the distribution
of the proceeds.58  Secured creditors generally will receive payment up to the amount
of their secured interest.  Unsecured creditors include those with priority claims and
those with non-priority claims.  Priority claims are paid in the order of priority so
long as there are funds available.59  When the funds are depleted, no more claims are
paid even if they are priority claims.  After all priority claims are paid, remaining
funds are distributed on a pro rata basis to the remaining unsecured creditors.  
Chapter 11.  Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code60 provides companies with
a way to continue in business while at the same time receiving protection from
creditors.  It also provides them with opportunities to modify debts and contracts61
in a way that enhances the company’s possibilities of recovering from financial
troubles.  It is generally believed that a business is worth more as a going concern
than as an assortment of assets that are sold separately.  Survival of the company
benefits creditors, employees, and the community in which the business is located.
In most cases, the company retains its management.  Generally, a trustee is appointed
only when management is removed “for cause.”62  However, even when a trustee is
not appointed, the company may decide to turn operation of the business over to a
“turnaround specialist” who has experience in guiding companies through Chapter
11 and into solvency.63
The reorganization plan is the key to a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  The plan is a
proposal, generally by the debtor-in-possession (DIP), as to how the valid claims of
each class of creditors are going to be resolved.64  To be confirmed, the plan must be
agreed to by at least one impaired class of claims.  Additionally, each holder of a
claim in an impaired class must accept the plan unless the amount received under the
plan is no less than the amount that would have been received under Chapter 7.65  In
a standard Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the plan proposal and negotiation with the
creditors takes place after the company has filed for bankruptcy.  In a prepackaged
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Chapter 11, the company does not file for bankruptcy until negotiations with
creditors have resulted in a confirmable plan that is presented when filing the
bankruptcy case.  This may have the effect of reducing uncertainty about the
company’s future.  Negotiating a prepackaged Chapter 11 does take some time, so
it is unclear to what extent a “prepack” would benefit the automakers, who say they
are rapidly running out of operating capital.  It is possible that conditioning receipt
of government assistance on a prepackaged agreement among the creditors might
encourage creditors to quickly reach negotiated modifications with debtor companies.
An additional benefit to a prepack is elimination of the need for arranging “DIP
financing.”
DIP financing involves agreements to provide funds to a debtor-in-possession
(DIP) to allow it to meet expenses incurred during reorganization.  If suppliers have
refused to continue shipments without prepayment, DIP financing can provide the
means of making the prepayment.  In some cases, simply having the loan agreements
is sufficient to restore supplier’s confidence and willingness to ship without
prepayment.  If one or more of the Detroit 3 filed under Chapter 11, it is possible that
government loans could provide the DIP financing.  The DIP financing lender can
enjoy the highest protection available in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  When used for
current operating expenses, the financing is an administrative expense under 11
U.S.C. § 503(b)(1) and would be a priority claim under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2).66  
Section 507 priorities are important in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy and must be
addressed in the reorganization plan, but Chapter 11 provides greater flexibility in the
payment of these claims than does Chapter 7.  The holders may agree either to
modify their claims or to accept alternative payment arrangements rather than
receiving full payment before other unsecured claims are paid.  If there is no such
agreement, the Code prescribes treatment for each priority claim that must be met for
the plan to be confirmed.  However, some of the statutory treatments allow deferred
payments or installment payments of amounts due.67  This added flexibility for
resolving priority claims may increase the amounts available to pay other unsecured
claims.  It may also make it possible for the company to meet its operations expenses
both short-term and long-term.  
The automakers have said that consumers will be unwilling to buy cars from a
company in bankruptcy due to concerns about future warranty coverage and
availability of manufacturer’s parts and that, therefore, filing Chapter 11 would lead
to liquidation rather than reorganization.  One might question whether the recent
urgent requests for financial assistance do not diminish consumer confidence at least
as much as would a bankruptcy filing designed to reorganize the company and lead
to financial viability.  In the past, Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection has been viewed
by some as providing the reorganizing company with a competitive advantage in the
marketplace by allowing it to reject burdensome contracts; modify CBAs; and reduce
total debt, reduce required payments, or both.  In that case, filing under Chapter 11
could boost consumer confidence in the troubled automakers.  A prepackaged
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Chapter 11 could also reduce the effect of a bankruptcy filing on consumer
confidence since the company would spend little time in bankruptcy.  However, if
Congress finds that concerns about warranty coverage is an issue that would doom
a reorganization, it could be possible to provide for alternative warranty coverage.
This might be funded with premiums paid by automakers, similar to premiums paid
by financial institutions to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
Assistance from the Federal Government
The idea of automakers receiving financial assistance from the federal
government is not new.  In 1980, the then financially troubled Chrysler sought $1.5
billion in loan guarantees from the federal government.  As part of the loan-guarantee
package, the government acquired warrants to purchase Chrysler stock at a set price
($13/share) until 1990.  In 1983, the government auctioned the warrants, which
Chrysler retired after making the winning bid ($311 million).68  Chrysler has operated
since then without additional assistance from the federal government.  It fully repaid
its loans within the agreed repayment period, though the company has acknowledged
that it faces an operating capital shortfall in late 2008. 
The Detroit 3 are now asking for direct loans from the federal government rather
than loan guarantees.  In the current credit market, alternate loan sources might be
scarce even with government guarantees for the loans.  However, direct loans from
the federal government commit government money more immediately than would
loan guarantees.  Several have questioned the advisability of extending such loans,
fearing that the troubled automakers may be unable to repay them even if the loan
terms are very favorable.  One particular concern is how these loans would be treated
if the automakers file for bankruptcy after receiving them.
Under current bankruptcy law, the loans, if unsecured, would enjoy no priority
status under 11 U.S.C. § 507.  This means that the government potentially could
“stand in line” with the other non-priority unsecured creditors and ultimately might
receive only a few pennies for each dollar of outstanding loan balance.  In the worst
case, there might be no funds to divide between these creditors.
It might be possible to protect the government’s financial interest; however,
doing so might go against existing policy in bankruptcy law.  Generally, the priorities
of the Code favor non-governmental creditors.  The major exception to this policy
is the priority given to some federal tax obligations, which are eighth in line of the
ten priorities provided in the Code. One method of protecting the government’s
interest in loans would be to modify the Code to accord a priority to those loans,
recognizing that such a priority would potentially disadvantage other priority
creditors whose claims held a lower priority.  Another method of protecting the
government’s interest in the loans would be to specifically exclude them from
discharge in bankruptcy either permanently or for a fixed period of time.69  
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The Code specifies a number of debts that are not dischargeable in bankruptcy.70
These are generally more applicable to individuals than to businesses.  Businesses
generally can receive a discharge of debts when they successfully emerge from
Chapter 11 bankruptcy as an ongoing business.71  Debts are not discharged in
bankruptcy for businesses that liquidate under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 11;
however, this is generally a distinction without meaning since, after liquidation, there
is no longer an entity to remain liable for the nondischarged debts.  Thus, statutorily
making a loan owed to the federal government nondischargeable would provide
protection for the government only if the borrower was able to successfully
reorganize and remain in business.  Ironically, the presumed protection provided by
making the debt nondischargeable could be illusory since such a large
nondischargeable debt could make it unfeasible to continue the business.  
It is possible to combine priority status and nondischargeability.72  This
combination of attributes could provide greater assurance that the government loans
would be repaid.  However, this assurance comes with a cost to other unsecured
creditors.  As mentioned above, those with priority claims that are lower in the
priority hierarchy would be disadvantaged, and giving priority to the government debt
increases the likelihood of nonpriority unsecured claims receiving little or nothing
in a Chapter 7 liquidation.  Combining priority status and nondischargeability might,
however, make successful reorganization more likely than it would be if the debt
were excluded from discharge, but not afforded priority status.  This is because the
priority status of the debt would generally result in some repayment as part of the
reorganization plan, leaving a smaller balance to survive the bankruptcy
reorganization, thus making it less likely that reorganization would be quickly
followed by liquidation.
Government-Sponsored Reorganization
Some have proposed a government-sponsored reorganization (GSR) that would
exist outside of the Bankruptcy Code.  Such a government-sponsored plan could take
many forms; for example, it could closely mirror Chapter 11 or it could be modeled
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after the conservatorships for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.73  Some believe that this
would provide a more expedient solution to the automakers’ current financial
challenges than would reorganization within the Bankruptcy Code.  Reasons cited
include a need for changes in the management of the companies, delays caused by
court proceedings, and the automakers’ concerns about the effect of the word
“bankruptcy” on consumers.  Proponents of a GSR want the government to condition
receipt of government funding on reorganization under new management, possibly
under some form of government management.  Designing a GSR outside the
Bankruptcy Code should be possible; however, it is impossible to predict what form
it might take.  There could also be constitutional considerations, including possible
takings clause issues.
It seems likely that most of what could be done outside of the Bankruptcy Code
could also be done within it, should Congress decide to modify it.  Although a
general Chapter 11 bankruptcy does not normally involve appointment of a trustee
to replace the company’s existing management, the provisions of the Railroad
Retirement Act require a trustee for railroad reorganizations.74 Congress, by
modifying the Bankruptcy Code, could require appointment of a trustee for
automobile manufacturer reorganizations.  
Proponents of a GSR believe that a GSR would be more time-efficient than
Chapter 11 because it would cut out the court approval process inherent in general
Chapter 11 bankruptcies.  However, if government financing were conditioned on a
prepackaged reorganization plan, the latter might be more time-efficient since,
generally, a prepackaged plan is confirmed on the day that the bankruptcy is filed.
This could also eliminate the issue regarding consumer reluctance to buy a car from
a manufacturer in bankruptcy.  
Pension and Health Care Issues
Pensions and Pension Insurance75
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.  Pension benefits provided
under qualified defined benefit plans are insured up to certain limits by the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), a government corporation established by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA, P.L. 93-406).  In 2008,
the PBGC insures the pensions of approximately 44 million workers and retirees in
more than 29,000 private-sector defined benefit pension plans.  The PBGC does not
insure pension benefits provided by state and local governments or benefits under
defined contribution plans, such as 401(k) plans.  The maximum pension benefit
guaranteed by the PBGC is set by law and adjusted annually. For plans that terminate
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in 2009, workers who retire at age 65 can receive up to $4,500 a month ($54,000 a
year). The guarantee is lower for those who retire early or when there is a benefit for
a survivor. The guarantee is higher for those who retire after age 65.
The PBGC receives no funds from general tax revenues.  The PBGC collects
insurance premiums from employers that sponsor insured pension plans, earns money
from investments, and receives funds from pension plans it takes over.  When the
PBGC takes over a pension plan, it assumes responsibility for future benefit
payments to the plan’s participants, up to the limits set in law.  In general, the PBGC
takes over only plans that are underfunded and that the employer is not expected to
be able to fully fund because it has filed for bankruptcy or is experiencing serious
financial difficulties that put its ability to fund its pension obligations at risk.
Consequently, in most cases in which the PBGC takes over a pension plan, it
assumes pension liabilities that are greater than the assets held by the pension plan
it has taken over.  In recent years, the PBGC has taken over several large pension
plans that were significantly underfunded.  As a result, the PBGC’s liabilities exceed
its assets.  
According to the most recent annual report of the PBGC, its insurance program
for single-employer plans had assets of $61.6 billion against liabilities of $72.3
billion on September 30, 2008.  If the current economic downturn were to result in
the termination of several large defined benefit plans with significant underfunding,
the PBGC’s deficit could grow rapidly.  Although ERISA does not provide for
supplementing the PBGC’s income with general tax revenues, it is likely that if the
PBGC were unable to meet its financial obligations to the participants whose
pensions it has taken over, there would be considerable political pressure on
Congress to provide the PBGC with the financial resources necessary for it to
continue to pay benefits to retirees and their surviving dependents.
In order to qualify for the tax exemptions and deferrals that Congress has
authorized for employer-sponsored retirement plans, defined benefit plans must meet
certain requirements established under ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code (IRC).
One requirement is that the plans must be “fully funded,” i.e., the plan’s assets must
equal or exceed its liabilities.  In most cases, the sponsor of a plan that is
underfunded is required to make additional contributions to the plan that would
amortize the underfunding in seven years or less.76  In addition to meeting the
funding requirements of ERISA and the IRC, companies that sponsor defined benefit
plans must report certain information about the plans annually to the Internal
Revenue Service.  This information is available to the public, but the financial data
is often out of date by the time it is released to the public.  Publicly traded companies
must report information about their pension plans to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).  These reports are generally available to the public immediately.
  
Funded Status of Auto Manufacturers Pension Plans.  General Motors
(GM), Ford, and Chrysler each maintain one or more defined benefit pension plans
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for workers employed in the United States.77   The companies have separate plans for
union members and nonunion workers. According to the information filed by GM
and Ford with the SEC in February 2008, both companies’ plans for U.S. employees
had assets in excess of plan liabilities at year-end 2007. GM reported a pension
surplus of $18.8 billion and Ford reported a pension surplus of $1.3 billion  (see
Table 3.)  GM’s pension surplus was equal to about 22% of its pension plan
liabilities, while Ford’s surplus was much smaller, amounting to 2.8% of its pension
liabilities.  As a privately-held company, Chrysler is not subject to the same SEC
reporting requirements as are GM and Ford.  Current information about Chrysler’s
pension plans was not available at the time this CRS report was written.78
Table 3. Funded Status of General Motors and Ford
 Pension Plans for U.S. Employees, Year-end 2007
(amounts in millions of dollars)
General Motors Ford Motor Co.
Benefit obligation (plan liabilities) $ 85,277 $ 44,493
Fair value of plan assets 104,070 45,759
Surplus or (Deficit) 18,793 1,266
Surplus (Deficit) as a percentage of liabilities 22.0% 2.8%
Estimated allocation of plan assets
Equity securities 26% 51%
Debt securities 52% 46%
Real estate, private equity, and other assets 22% 3%
Source: Company filings of Form 10-K with the Securities and Exchange Commission, Feb. 2008.
Several factors have affected the funding status of the automakers’ pension
plans this year. Among the most important of these factors are:
! Stock prices have fallen sharply in 2008, depressing the value of
pension fund assets.  This would tend to reduce pension surpluses
and increase pension deficits.
! Long-term interest rates have risen during 2008, reducing pension
plan liabilities. This would tend to increase pension surpluses and
reduce pension deficits.
! Plan participants have accrued an additional year of pension
benefits.
! Plan sponsors have, in some cases, made contributions to their
pension plans.
! Certain one-time events may have occurred including plan
amendments to raise or lower future benefit accruals, the sale or
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acquisition of businesses with pension liabilities, and the expiration
or initiation of collective bargaining agreements.
GM Pension Fund.  In its most recent quarterly filing with the SEC, GM
noted several factors that reduced its pension surplus, including:
! investment losses of $6.3 billion in its pension plan asset portfolio;
! recording a $2.7 billion liability related to a settlement agreement
with the United Auto Workers (UAW) related to retiree medical
care; 
! recording a $2.7 billion liability due to the increase in the monthly
pension benefit paid to salaried employees as compensation for the
elimination of post-65 healthcare benefits; 
! the transfer of $2.1 billion of Delphi Corporation pension liabilities
to GM; and 
! recording a $2.0 billion cost due to special workforce attrition
programs for union members.
GM reported in November 2008 that its plan for hourly workers was
underfunded by $500 million as of September 30 and that its plan for salaried
employees was overfunded as of June 30.  The plans were overfunded on a combined
basis.  GM recently stated that it does not expect to have to make any contributions
to its defined benefit plans in 2008.79
Ford Pension Fund.  The two most significant factors affecting the funding
status of Ford’s pension plans since year-end 2007 are the decline in the stock market
and in the increase in long-term interest rates.  Based on the estimated percentage of
Ford’s pension plan assets invested in stocks, if its pension fund assets performed as
the major market indices have in 2008, Ford’s pension assets invested in equities
would have lost $8.2 billion to $9.4 billion in value through the first eleven months
of 2008.  This would represent 18% to 20% of the value of assets held by Ford’s U.S.
pension plans at year-end 2007. The effect of the decline in asset prices has been
offset to some extent by the rise in long-term interest rates in 2008.80  Rising interest
rates reduce the present value of pension liabilities.  In its most recent 10-K filing
with the SEC,  Ford estimated that an increase of 0.25% in interest rates would
reduce its pension liabilities by 2.3%. Based on an estimated increase in the discount
rate of 1.0% in 2008, Ford’s pension liabilities would have fallen by $4.1 billion this
year.  This would represent a 9.2% decline in Ford’s year-end 2007 pension
liabilities.
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 In its SEC filing for the third quarter of 2008, Ford stated that during the first
nine months of 2008, it “contributed $1.9 billion to our worldwide pension plans,”
and that the company expected to contribute an additional $300 million in 2008.
Although the statement did not specify how much of this contribution was made to
its U.S. plans, less than 10% of Ford’s pension contributions in 2007 and less than
15% of its contributions in 2006 were made to its U.S. defined benefit plans. 
Recent PBGC Actions.   In a November 2008 interview with The Wall Street
Journal, PBGC Director Charles Millard characterized the current funding of the
automakers’ plans as “OK,” but he said that the agency is concerned that the cost of
funding early retirement incentives could cause financial difficulties for their pension
plans in future years.81  During the week of November 24, the PBGC sent letters to
General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler stating the agency’s concern that early retirement
incentives offered to employees could adversely affect the funding of their pension
plans, and asking the companies to inform the PBGC of the costs of their buyout and
early retirement programs.82  The PBGC is concerned that buyout and early
retirement programs were not fully accounted for when the automakers estimated
their pension liabilities, and that these programs could “undermine the state of the
plans.”83  
PBGC Director Millard also recently stated that if an automaker were to initiate
a termination of a pension plan while in bankruptcy, the agency would oppose the
termination.84   According to Mr. Millard’s public statements, the PBGC would argue
in federal court that the companies’ should maintain their defined benefit pension
plans.85 
Health Care Issues86
If an automaker files for bankruptcy, health care coverage for both active and
retired workers and their families could be at risk.  The risk differs depending on
whether the bankruptcy is a liquidation under Chapter 7 or a bankruptcy
reorganization under Chapter 11, whether individuals are still working or retired, and
whether they are covered by a collective bargaining agreement.  Individuals options
for obtaining alternative coverage, either private or public, also differ; factors such
as age or Medicare eligibility, income, and family circumstances could be important.
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 There is pending litigation including possible appeals or court challenges that could
potentially affect the VEBA terms and conditions.
The 111th Congress might consider broad health care reforms that could provide
further options at some point in the future.
The future funding status for retiree health insurance for workers covered by a
collective bargaining agreement may be uncertain.  During the 2007 contract
negotiations, each of the three firms reached separate agreements with the UAW to
contribute a percentage of their projected retiree liabilities to a Voluntary Employee
Beneficiary Association (VEBA).   Following their initial VEBA contributions in
2007, the firms agreed to make additional contributions to the VEBA trust between
2008 and 2010.  In total, the Detroit 3 contributions are projected to fund 64% of
their future retiree health obligations.87  By 2010,  the VEBA will be managed by an
independent board of trustees appointed by the UAW and the court.88   However, the
extent of the negotiated 2008 to 2010 contributions to the VEBA will depend on the
financial conditions of the Detroit 3.  Under Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the Detroit 3 and
the UAW may seek to renegotiate retiree health insurance benefits during the
reorganization process.  Under Chapter 7 bankruptcy liquidation, the UAW would
become one in a line of unsecured creditors; in this situation, these retirees may
receive reduced coverage or even no health insurance at all.  In the absence of
bankruptcy, the Detroit 3 and/or the UAW may also seek renegotiation to reduce the
funding requirements of the VEBA.  Reduced funding requirements may improve the
financial pictures of the firms and help guarantee that the unionized retirees receive
some health insurance benefits.
Bankruptcy filing could also threaten health plans for union workers and
nonunion workers and retirees.  Under a liquidation, there would presumably be no
health plans remaining for any former workers or retirees.  In the event of a
bankruptcy reorganization under Chapter 11, if a firm continues to provide health
benefits to its workers, certain individuals would be entitled to purchase health
benefits through COBRA (Title X of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1985, P.L. 99-272).  
Under COBRA, employers who offer health insurance must offer the option of
continued health insurance coverage at group rates to qualified employees and their
families who are faced with loss of coverage due to certain events, such as a
termination of employment or a reduction in hours.  Employers are not required to
pay for the cost of COBRA coverage. They are permitted to charge the covered
beneficiary 100% of the premium (both the portion paid by the employee and the
portion paid by the employer, if any), plus an additional 2% administrative fee. The
continued coverage for the employee and the employee’s spouse and dependent
children must continue for 18 months.
A retiree may have access to COBRA coverage in the event that a former
employer terminates the retiree health plan as a result of a bankruptcy reorganization
under Chapter 11.  In this case, the coverage can continue until the death of the
retiree. The retiree’s spouse and dependent children may purchase COBRA coverage
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from the former employer for 36 months after the retiree’s death.  However,
beginning on January 1, 2009, GM will follow the lead of Ford and Chrysler, and
stop providing non-union retirees with health benefits once they become eligible for
Medicare at age 65.  Instead, retirees will receive additional funds which they may
choose to use to purchase Medicare supplemental policies.  These individuals would
not qualify for COBRA, as they will no longer be receiving health insurance.
The 111th Congress may consider broad health care reforms that could help
some autoworkers, either active or retired, and their family members to obtain and
pay for health care coverage.  While it is unclear when specific proposals will be
developed, let alone whether they will be adopted, the possibility of reforms might
be taken into account as policy makers consider the financial future of the auto
industry and its workers.   
During the election campaign, President-Elect Obama proposed a National
Health Insurance Exchange that would give all Americans access to a new public
plan or approved private plans based upon the Federal Employees Health Benefits
Plan (FEHBP).  Businesses would have to offer meaningful coverage or pay a
percentage of payroll into a financing fund.  Coverage would not be mandatory for
adults, though it would be for children.   Small businesses could get a refundable tax
credit to help with their costs.   Senator McCain’s approach included replacing the
current tax exemption for employer-provided health benefits with specific tax credits,
making changes to the individual insurance market, and providing federal funding
to expand state high-risk pools.  
One early Congressional proposal has been outlined by Senator Max Baucus,
Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee.89  Under this proposal, a Health
Insurance Exchange would be established for individuals and small businesses to
purchase private health insurance.  Individuals would be required to have coverage,
and large employers would either offer plans or pay penalties.  Tax credits would be
available to some.   In addition, Medicaid and the State Children’s Health Insurance
Program (SCHIP) would be expanded.  Still other proposals might be put forth based
upon comprehensive reform bills that were introduced in the 110th Congress, such
as S. 334 introduced by Senator Ron Wyden and co-sponsored by both Democrats
and Republicans. 
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Stipulations and Conditions on Loans
Most supporters and advocates of assistance to the Detroit 3 through a program
of federal direct loans have acknowledged that such assistance may be accompanied
by conditions placed by Congress on the Detroit 3 and their management.  The two
most widely circulated legislative proposals of November 2008 both addressed this
issue, and in similar ways.  These two proposals were S. 3688 and a draft bill on the
House side (the House was never in session in November 2008, so no measure could
have been introduced).  Excluding terms relating to loan repayment and financial
oversight, the stipulations related to conditions of executive pay for the recipient
companies are described below.  In addition, the House bill would have established
more direct oversight of company management by a federally appointed board
expanded from that established under EESA.  Consideration could also be given to
other conditions or restrictions on operations of recipient companies.
Executive Pay and Compensation90
Five standards for executive compensation standards, which would be required
under S. 3688 for recipients of bridge loans, are set out in the new §406(e), with
which the bill would amend EESA.  Three of them are essentially identical to
provisions applied to financial institutions already in EESA.
! New §406(e)(2)(A) places limits on compensation to discourage
senior executive officers from taking “unnecessary and excessive
risks.” 
The provision is identical to a compensation provision elsewhere in EESA for
financial institutions that receive direct capital injections in exchange for giving the
U.S. government equity stakes.   The provision’s operative phrase,  “ ... take
unnecessary and excessive risks...” is broad, thus providing interpretative leeway.
There is a widely held view that one of the contributing causes of the financial crisis
that led to the enactment of the EESA was the managerial compensation structure at
Wall Street firms:  many think that their pay packages overly emphasized short-term
incentives such as bonuses, helping to encourage often reckless and harmful behavior
driven by the pursuit of short term corporate profits.91  Concerns over the relationship
between managerial incentive compensation and exceptional risk taking appears,
however, to be largely confined to specific parts of the financial sector such as the
investment banking sector and hedge funds.  In addition, a number of compensation
consultants have observed that while the use of uncapped annual incentive pay has
been a significant element feature of many financial service firms, the practice is said
to be generally atypical outside of the sector.92  
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Within the motor vehicle industry, the provision raises a fundamental policy
question: to what extent would the discouragement of risk-taking behavior also result
in the discouragement of potentially beneficial, innovative, and entrepreneurial
behavior?  For example, in late 2007, General Motors announced that it hoped to
start selling cars powered by hydrogen fuel-cells by 2011.93   If an automaker began
embarking on developing such technology, under the “excessive risk” provision
should such undertakings be seen as excessive risk taking or potentially beneficial
and innovative entrepreneurship?
The issue of the objectivity and independence of board members and senior
managers in implementing the mandate has already been raised under EESA.  The
Treasury Department interpretation of the identical provision in EESA places a
burden on a corporate board’s compensation committee, along with certain managers,
to evaluate senior official compensation packages for “unnecessary and excessive
risks” in an ostensibly unbiased  manner.94  Thus, to the extent that legitimate
concerns over excessive risk taking do exist, the  employee status of such managers
has raised concerns over their ability to detach themselves from senior management.
Moreover, there is a vigorous and ongoing debate over the extent to which members
of corporate boards are able to act independently of management’s influence.95
! New §406(e)(2)(B) establishes a “clawback provision” that would
provide for the recovery by the loan recipient of any bonus or
incentive compensation paid to a senior executive officer if the
financial reporting or other criteria that it was based on are later
proven to be materially inaccurate.  
Again, this provision is identical to one already in EESA.  It represents  a
somewhat different approach to the recoupment of executive bonuses and incentives
due to financial reporting misstatements than does the clawback provision in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ( P.L.107-204).  Both were a response to the widespread
corporate misstatements of corporate earnings that were widely observed in the
preceding years.  Unlike the Sarbanes-Oxley clawback provision, which only applies
to the chief executive officer (CEO) and chief financial officer (CFO) of publicly
traded companies, the provisions in S. 3688 would apply to privately held firms and
the top five senior officers, including the CEO and the CFO.  The Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) reportedly has rarely prosecuted violations of
Sarbanes-Oxley’s clawback provision.  Possibly, this is because executives often
settle financial misstatement cases without admitting wrongdoing, thus avoiding the
triggering the provision, and because of how the pivotal concept of “misconduct” is
interpreted.96 
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! New §406(e)(2)(C) prohibits a participating institution from
awarding golden parachutes to any of its top five senior executive
officers during the period that a loan is outstanding.
This provision is also identical to a provision elsewhere in the EESA.  Golden
parachutes are defined in the relevant Treasury Department interpretation as
payments of more than 2.99 times an executive’s  average base compensation from
a firm over the five most recent years in the event of the official’s involuntary
termination, or bankruptcy or receivership of a financial institution.  This is also a
definition that Treasury has used for tax purposes for many years.97  Explaining the
basic rationale for the provision, a Treasury Department official observed that “... our
key focus is that we do not want to reward poor performance ...”98
There are concerns that the provision sets too high a level of reward to have
much impact.  Some executive compensation consultants stress that it is uncommon
for executive severance payments to reach the size that would trigger the provision’s
parameters.  They note that such relatively large payments do not normally occur
unless an executive is released without cause immediately after a “change in control”
situation, usually involving a corporate takeover.99  Echoing that view, in a letter of
October 29, 2008, to Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, Senate Majority Leader
Harry Reid and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi said  “... [G]iven the level of public
outrage over these compensation schemes....  We would urge you, in particular, to
consider the possibility of further restrictions on the use of ‘golden parachutes’ at
such [participating]  institutions...”100
! New §406(e)(2)(D) prohibits a loan recipient from paying or
accruing any bonus or incentive compensation during the period that
the loan is outstanding to any executive whose annual base
compensation exceeds $250,000.
Unlike the aforementioned provisions, the stricture on the payment of executive
bonuses in S. 3688 is not already a part of EESA. Studies on corporate compensation
describe executive bonuses as a popular type of variable incentive pay normally given
as a once-a-year payment tied to some short-term performance goals.  These can
range from  judgments on executive performance by a corporate board,  to levels of
company profits or company sectoral market share.  After the EESA’s enactment,
there was concern expressed both in and out of Congress over reports that executives
at financial firms participating in the EESA were receiving what many perceived to
be excessively large bonuses, an issue not specifically addressed in the law’s
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restrictions on executive pay.  A central concern was that participating companies
were using EESA funding to pay for bonuses, a charge that firm executives denied.
Among those in Congress expressing concerns was Representative Henry Waxman,
Chairman of the House Oversight Committee, who indicated the funds “might be
used for extravagant pensions or bonuses or dividends or any other purpose,
inconsistent with what the Congress intended.”101 The chairman subsequently
requested documents on the compensation and bonus structures from the nine
financial firms that had received EESA funds to date, and this new provision was
added to S. 3688. 
Some executives in recent years have received substantial bonuses in the
automobile industry.  In 2007, Ford reported that CEO Allan Mulally received $2
million in base salary, and $4 million in bonuses (he had also received $18.5 million
in bonuses in 2006).  Ford also reported that the next four highest paid officials
received between $1 million and  $780,000 in base salary and between $708,000 and
$439,000 in bonuses.  General Motors reported that the 2007 base salary paid to its
top five officials ranged from CEO G. Richard Wagoner’s $1.56 million down to
$825,000, but none of the GM officials received bonuses in 2007.  There are news
reports that Chrysler, which as a privately owned company is not required to disclose
data on executive compensation,  has contractual agreements to pay what originally
totaled  $30 million in retention bonuses (reportedly reduced because some of the
officials left) to about 50 executives, to be paid out  in August 2009.  The retention
bonuses were crafted by Chrysler’s former parent, DaimlerChrysler, as it was
preparing to sell Chrysler to Cerberus Capital Management, its current owner.  Three
of Chrysler’s top paid executives, CEO Robert Nardelli, President James Press, and
Vice-Chairman Tom LaSorda, are reportedly not participating in the plan.  However,
according to Daimler filings, in 2007, Mr. LaSorda did receive a $15.7 million bonus
for his help in Chrysler’s sale to Cerberus.102
   
A Chrysler official justified the bonuses because of  the need to ensure potential
buyers that key company  executives would remain in place after the sale, while
acknowledging that they had become a source of controversy.103  Nonetheless, the
official also emphasized that it was important to keep in mind that the bonuses had
been crafted by DaimlerChrysler, the company’s former owner, and that they appear
to have been effective in keeping its executive talent in place.  The sentiment was
shared by a number observers, including an official from Challenger Gray &
Christmas, a national executive placement company, who said that firms tend to view
them as instrumental to stemming a loss of leadership during critical times.  But
others charged the executives had “... run the companies into the ground” and
questioned the need for auto industry executive retention bonuses.104
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! New §406(e)(2)(E) prohibits any compensation plan that could
encourage manipulation of the reported earnings of the recipient to
enhance the compensation of any of its employees.
This provision was not previously part of EESA.  Earnings manipulation, often
referred to as earnings management, is an umbrella term that is used to encompass
everything from earnings “smoothing” to outright accounting fraud. Investors,
analysts, and auditors disapprove of such actions, because it makes reported
corporate earnings less reliable as a measure of firm performance. A perceived
epidemic of earnings management was a significant impetus behind the enactment
of the  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which contained a broad range of corporate
governance and accounting reforms.  
Publicly traded companies have a long history of using stock options as a major
component of executive compensation; the strategy’s central objective is aligning a
executives’ personal interests with those of shareholders. In 2007, Ford reported that
its stock option awards to its top five senior executives ranged between $2.49 million
and $7.51 million.  General Motors reported that its option awards to its top five
executives ranged from $534,000 to $3.77 million. 
There is a growing body of research that has found that executive stock options
can have unintended negative consequences with respect to encouraging a greater
tendency toward earnings manipulation.  For example, one empirical study found
statistical evidence that earnings manipulation is more likely where stock options
play a larger role in CEO compensation.105  Another study concluded that CEOs were
more apt to manipulate firm earnings when they had more out-of-the-money stock
options106 and lower holdings of conventional company stock.107  Jack
Dolmat-Connell, president of Dolmat-Connell & Partners, an
executive-compensation consulting firm, observed, “While I think that options are
an extremely good driver of performance, there’s no downside to them from the
executive’s standpoint... [Y]ou have to have someone with unethical standards who
gets lots of stock options for misrepresentation and fraud to occur. If you give
someone with strong ethical standards lots of options, nothing is likely to happen.”108
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Thus, it could be argued that to faithfully implement the provision’s “prohibition
on any compensation plan that could encourage manipulation of the reported
earnings” of a recipient firm, companies would have to insure that executive stock
option packages were tailored properly to balance their positive incentive attributes
with their potential for encouraging inappropriate behavior.  This may assume that
the process is conducted with a minimum of executive influence and bias, which, as
noted earlier, may be difficult. 
Fuel Economy and Advanced Vehicle Technologies109
A major stipulation that may be placed on any federal auto industry assistance
is an improvement in vehicle fuel economy and/or the incorporation of advanced
technologies such as electric drive or hybrid systems. For example, the Department
of Energy’s Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing (ATVM) Loan
Program110 requires that any projects funded by the program produce vehicles with
at least 25% higher fuel economy than a comparable MY2005 vehicle.111  Some  auto
industry critics argue that additional auto industry assistance should explicitly require
the incorporation of new technologies or would require additional fuel economy
improvements above those required by the  ATVM program.
A key question surrounding any requirement that automakers improve fuel
economy to qualify for assistance is: Should that improvement be above and beyond
any current federal mandates?  In addition to the ATVM program, EISA requires that
automakers increase their average fuel economy to 35 mpg by 2020, up from roughly
24 mpg today.  One potential criticism of the ATVM program is that it effectively
assists automakers in achieving compliance with a federal mandate.  For additional
federal assistance, some have proposed that further improvements in fuel economy
may be required.
However, the auto industry will likely face high costs to comply with the
upgraded CAFE standards.  For example, in its Preliminary Regulatory Impact
Analysis (PRIA) of proposed CAFE regulations for MY2011 through MY2015, the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) estimated that
automakers would face roughly $16 billion in incremental costs for passenger cars
and $31 billion for light trucks.112  Of that $47 billion total, roughly $30 billion would
fall on the Detroit 3 automakers.  Figure 2 shows the estimated incremental costs
from the proposed rule for various automakers in just one model year, MY2015.  The
higher total costs for the Detroit 3 reflect their higher unit sales, as well as — in
many cases — higher expected per-vehicle costs.  Supporters of the Detroit 3
automakers argue that the costs of CAFE compliance — on top of other high costs
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Source: CRS Analysis of  National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), Preliminary
Regulatory Impact Analysis: Corporate Average Fuel Economy for MY2011-2015 Passenger Cars
and Light Trucks (April 2008).
Other Conditions in Oversight of Company Management113
S. 3688 did not establish an oversight board regarding companies receiving
loans to the automotive industry beyond what was established in EESA for financial
institutions.  The House draft bill would have added the Secretaries of Energy, Labor,
and Transportation, and the EPA Administrator, to the five-member EESA board.
In addition to oversight of the loan program, the House bill proposed authority of the
board to review and prohibit any asset sale, investment, contract, or other
commitment that recipients might make if the transaction were valued at more than
$25 million.
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The House draft legislation would also have required a “long-term restructuring
plan” to be submitted by March 31, 2009.  Such plans would have to address:
! Fuel efficiency and advanced technology vehicle manufacturing
requirements as established in EISA;
! “Rationalization” of relationships with hourly workers, suppliers,
and dealers;
! Restructuring of existing debt and raising of private capital going
forward.
By comparison to the broadly defined elements of these plans , the Chrysler loan
guarantee legislation of 1980 was far more prescriptive in exchange for a loan
guarantee that was worth far less than the $25 billion requested by the Detroit 3 in
2008, even allowing for inflation.114  The 1980 law (P.L. 96-185) in Section 4
required that Chrysler raise “at least $1.43 billion” in “nonfederally guaranteed
assistance,” including through specified minimum amounts of state and municipal
loans, asset sales, and loans from suppliers and dealers.  Section 6 required union
wage and benefit reductions totaling $462 million, including givebacks from the most
recent contract bargaining agreement, and a further $125 million in concessions from
salaried workers. Section 5 established general oversight of the corporation,
including a provision that the company would guarantee “no substantial likelihood
that ... [it] would be absorbed by or merged with any foreign entity.”  While the
Chrysler loan guarantee program has been widely praised by members of Congress
and others as a success, it has been less noted that Chrysler reduced its employment
total by more than half  between 1979 and 1982 — from 142,000 to 66,000, for a loss
of 76,000 jobs.115
Before any final legislation is developed and approved on this assistance, it is
possible that Congress will impose additional conditions to those already discussed
or introduced in 2008.  As noted earlier, some members have stated that loans should
not be made unless unions accept reduction or modification of hourly workers’
benefits not common else where in industry.  On the other hand some commentators
have also suggested that assistance should be linked to job protections for workers
such as, for example, in a GM-Chrysler merger. Members have also sought
assurances that investments funded by federal loans should only be made in the
United States.  Such a restriction could conflict with the terms of the North American
Free Trade Agreement, the fact that Detroit 3 operations are highly integrated across
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North America, and the efforts of the industry also to seek government financial
support from Canada.116
